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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











a/k/a German Rosario, 
 
        Appellant 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-17-cr-00553-001) 
District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
On January 24, 2020 
 
Before: AMBRO, MATEY and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 







ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 After conditionally pleading guilty to several drug-related offenses, Herman 
Rosario appealed the District Court’s order, denying his motion to suppress evidence 
seized from one of three locations, searched by the police.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
I.1 
 On October 11, 2017, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Rosario with 
(1) conspiracy to distribute heroin, (2) possession with intent to distribute heroin, (3) 
possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and (4) possession of a firearm 
by a convicted felon, based on evidence seized during June and July 2017 from three 
locations in Philadelphia:  1908 East Wishart Street, 2863 North 4th Street, and 1611 
South 28th Street.  Before trial, Rosario and his co-defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence seized from 1611 South 28th Street, arguing that the search warrant for that 
location was not supported by probable cause and that the good faith exception did not 
apply to permit the admission of evidence seized through the invalid warrant. 
 The application for the search warrant was filed on July 12, 2017, by Officer Neil 
Carr, a veteran for over thirteen years in the Philadelphia Police Department narcotics 
unit.  The affidavit accompanying the application averred that in June 2017 law 
enforcement conducted an investigation into the illegal sale of narcotics in the area of 
Jasper and Wishart Street.  The investigation established that Rosario was supplying 
narcotics sold in the area to an accomplice, who would then provide the narcotics to street 
 
1 We write primarily for the parties who are familiar with the facts and the record, which 
we recite only as necessary to explain our decision.   
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dealers and pay Rosario sums of cash at 1908 East Wishart Street.  In addition, Rosario 
was observed traveling on multiple occasions from 1908 East Wishart Street to 2863 
North 4th Street after receiving money from his accomplice, and from 2863 North 4th 
Street to 1908 East Wishart Street to provide his accomplice with what is believed to be 
narcotics.   
Based on the evidence from that investigation, warrants were executed for 1908 
East Wishart Street and 2863 North 4th Street, where law enforcement found large 
amounts of narcotics, nearly $20,000 in cash, a handgun, and two pictures of Rosario.  
Law enforcement then received a description of Rosario’s vehicle and information 
indicating that Rosario was staying at 1611 South 28th Street.  After setting up 
surveillance around that house, law enforcement observed Rosario going in and out every 
day for four days and operating a vehicle that fit the provided description.  Based on 
these representations in Officer Carr’s affidavit, a search warrant for 1611 South 28th 
Street, seeking narcotics, records of drug activities, proceeds from drug sales, and 
firearms, was approved on July 13 and executed the next day.  Over a kilogram of various 
narcotics, drug packaging and drug-dealing paraphernalia, cash, and a loaded firearm 
were uncovered during the search.  
 The District Court denied Rosario and his co-defendant’s motion to suppress 
evidence seized from 1611 South 28th Street, holding that the affidavit provided 
substantial basis to support probable cause and that in the alternative, the good faith 
exception would have permitted the admission of the evidence seized from that location.  
Rosario subsequently entered into a plea agreement admitting guilt to all counts while 
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preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence.  After he was 
sentenced, he appealed. 
II. 
“We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to 
the underlying factual findings, and we exercise plenary review of its application of the 
law to those facts.”2  “[A] search warrant, supported by probable cause, is normally 
necessary before law enforcement may lawfully search a person’s property.”3  In 
reviewing a challenge to a magistrate’s probable cause determination, our role is simply 
to ensure that “the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that the affidavit 
supporting the warrant established probable cause.”4  Probable cause exists “when, 
viewing the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”5   
In the context of drug-dealing activities, we have observed that “evidence of 
involvement in the drug trade is likely to be found where the dealers reside.”6  However, 
we have also recognized that this inference hinges on three premises:  “(1) that the person 
suspected of drug dealing is actually a drug dealer; (2) that the place to be searched is 
 
2 United States v. Williams, 898 F.3d 323, 328–29 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States 
v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 651-52 (3d Cir. 2011)), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1351 (2019) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
3 United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 102 (3d Cir. 2002).   
4 United States v. Stevenson, 832 F.3d 412, 428–29 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States 
v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
5 Miknevich, 638 F.3d at 182 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
6 United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 2000) (collecting authorities); 
Burton, 288 F.3d at 103. 
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possessed by, or the domicile of, the dealer; and (3) that the home contains contraband 
linking it to the dealer’s drug activities.”7  In short, we will affirm the District Court’s 
denial of Rosario’s motion to suppress if Officer Carr’s affidavit sufficiently supports 
these three premises.8  We agree with the District Court that it does. 
First, the affidavit amply supported probable cause to believe that Rosario was a 
drug dealer.  It averred that Rosario was a supplier of narcotics who received payment 
through an intermediary and had been observed traveling between two locations where 
large quantities of narcotics, nearly twenty thousand dollars in cash, a firearm, and 
pictures of him were found.  It is more than reasonable to infer from this information that 
Rosario “was a drug dealer and not simply a user” operating from those locations.9 
Second, the affidavit contained ample evidence that 1611 South 28th Street was 
Rosario’s residence.  After receiving information about the vehicle that Rosario was 
operating and where he was staying, law enforcement confirmed through multiple days of 
surveillance that Rosario was staying at 1611 South 28th Street and was driving the 
 
7 Burton, 288 F.3d at 104. 
8 See id. at 104–05 (declining to suppress evidence found at drug dealer’s residence after 
finding that facts contained in the affidavit supported all three premises). 
9 See id. at 104 (finding sufficient support in the affidavit for the premise that the 
appellant was a drug dealer based on observations made and inferences drawn about large 
amounts of cash and narcotics the appellant was dealing in). 
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described vehicle to and from that residence.  Nothing more is required under our 
precedent.10 
Third, the affidavit provided ample support for the premise that the 1611 South 
28th Street residence contained contraband linking it to Rosario’s drug activities.  We 
have described a number of factors that “help establish the required nexus between a 
defendant’s drug-dealing activities and his home,” including “large-scale operations, a 
defendant’s attempts to evade officers’ questions about his address, the conclusions of 
experienced officers regarding where evidence of a crime is likely to be found, the 
proximity of the defendant’s residence to the location of criminal activity, probable cause 
to arrest the defendant on drug-related charges,” and tips of concerned citizens that a 
specific item “would be found” in the defendant’s residence.11   
Many of these factors are present in this case.  Rosario was a supplier in a large-
scale drug-dealing operation that involved multiple persons and generated at least tens of 
thousands of dollars in revenue.  Officer Carr, with over thirteen years of experience in 
the narcotics unit, believed that firearms, narcotics, and/or narcotics proceeds were being 
stored and/or sold from 1611 South 28th Street.  At the time of the warrant, there was 
 
10 See United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 563–64 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding sufficient 
support in the affidavit for the premise that the property searched was one of the 
appellees’ residence based on an informant’s tip averring that the appellee resided there 
and subsequent surveillance confirming that the appellee had stayed there one night with 
his vehicle). 
11 Id. at 559–60 (collecting authorities) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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evidence supporting probable cause to arrest Rosario on drug-related charges.12  Finally, 
the three locations are only miles from each other in the same city.13     
We thus agree with the District Court that “the totality of the circumstances 
provided in the affidavit supports the premises that Rosario was actually a drug dealer, 
that 1611 South 28th Street was Rosario’s domicile, and that 1611 South 28th Street 
would contain contraband related to Rosario’s drug-dealing activities.”14  Rosario 
contends that there was no indication that the police had obtained information that he or 
anyone else was engaged in any illegal activity at 1611 South 28th Street.  However, “it 
is well established that direct evidence is not required for the issuance of a search 
warrant.  Instead, probable cause can be, and often is, inferred by considering the type of 
crime, the nature of the items sought, the suspect’s opportunity for concealment and 
normal inferences about where a criminal might hide stolen property.”15   
Here, the totality of the circumstances established that evidence of involvement in 
the drug trade was likely to be found at 1611 South 28th Street, where Rosario resided. 
 
12 See Burton, 288 F.3d at 98–99 (holding that the police had probable cause to arrest 
defendant because the “significant accumulation of evidence supporting a drug 
transaction justified a reasonable inference that a felony was being committed”). 
13 See United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that the fact that 
the defendant’s home was in the same city as the location of his anticipated drug delivery 
“render[ed] his home a more likely repository of his drug-related paraphernalia”).  
Rosario indicated that the distance between 1611 South 28th Street and the other two 
residences was at most twelve miles and a drive could take up to thirty minutes.  
14 App. 25. 
15 United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (collecting authorities) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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We find no error in the conclusion of the District Court that there was a fair probability 
that evidence of a crime would be found at the 28th Street location.16 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court, denying 
Rosario’s motion to suppress. 
 
16 See Stevenson, 832 F.3d at 429–30; Stearn, 597 F.3d 563–65; Whitner, 219 F.3d at 
298–99  
